PARTITION 1947 PART 2

 PARTITION 1947

 By the time that Mountbatten arrived in India to take over as Viceroy from Wave11 on 22 March 1947 the Government of India had a pretty clear idea as to what the State of Jammu and Kashmir might wish to do after the Transfer of Power. If at all possible, it would opt for independence from India. As the British Resident in Jammu and Kashmir reported from Srinagar on 14 November 1946: I am inclined to think that the Maharaja and Kak . . . [Pandit R.C. Kak, Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashrnir from 1945 until 11 August 19471 . . . are seriously considering the possibility of Kashrnir not joining the . . . [Indian] . . . Union if it is formed. . . . The Maharaja's attitude is, I suspect, that once Paramountcy disappears Kashmir will have to stand on its own feet, and that the question of loyalty to the British Government will not arise and that Kashmir will be free to ally herself with any power - not excluding Russia - she chooses.' In that a major objective of British policy since the sale of the Vale of Kashmir to Gulab Singh in 1846 had been to keep Russian influence out of that north-western corner of the Indian subcontinent which the State of Jammu and Kashmir occupied (as we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4), this was an alarming conclusion. Russian influence, now Communist, could well threaten the stability of the successors to the British. It would be best if the State of Jammu and Kashmir were prevented from experiments in an independent foreign policy. Firm control over the State was clearly called for; and there were arguments current among those who determined British Indian strategy that this could more effectively be exercised by India than by Pakistan. A hint that Jawaharlal Nehru, who would certainly be the Prime Minister of independent India, was of like view, emerged from a meeting with Mountbatten on 22 April 1947. When Mountbatten pointed out that the Princely States "would have complete freedom of choice" as to which successor entity to the British they could join "independent of geographical considerations", Nehru noted correctly enough that "the future of Kashmir might produce a difficult problem".n On 29 April 1947 Mountbatten showed that he had been giving considerable thought to one important aspect of the geopolitics of the State of Jammu and Kashmir when he advised the Secretary of State for India in the British Government, Lord Listowel, on the problem of the future of the Gilgit Lease and its dependencies. What would happen here when Paramountcy lapsed? At this point the date for the Transfer of Power was still understood to be June 1948. Mountbatten recommended that the entire area of the Gilgit Lease should be returned to the State of Jammu and Kashmir before then, perhaps as early as October 1947. Listowel agreed. Jawaharlal Nehru, too, concurred when asked what he thought about this major strategic problem. M.A. Jinnah does not appear to have been consulted." Morrntbatten's attitude towards the Gilgit Lease is extremely  interesting. As we have already seen in Chapter 4, that region which the British knew as the Gilgit Agency, was leased from the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir in 1935 for sixty years. The main reason was strategic, the need to observe and, perhaps, counter actively, Soviet influence in Sinkiang, a need which certainly had not disappeared in 1947. It would be difficult to make out a case for the transfer at this juncture of the defence of Gilgit to Maharaja Sir Hari Singh: it was largely to keep the area out of the Maharaja's hands that the Gilgit Lease had been secured in the first place. Yet here was Mountbatten apparently abandoning this vital outpost to the Jammu and Kashmir State authorities. It was an action which only made sense on the assumption that those authorities would soon turn out to be based not in Srinagar and Jammu but either in New Delhi or in Karachi. Had Mountbatten, or his advisers in what was a technical matter of Indian strategy, been prepared to let Pakistan be the guardian of the Gilgit Agency and the high passes of the Karakoram, he could perfectly well have left the Gilgit Lease alone. The original contract was between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Government of India. Paramountcy had nothing to do with it. There was no reason why it should lapse automatically on 15 August 1947; and as an added precaution its extension could have been covered easily enough by a Standstill Agreement. In which case, it could be argued that the tenancy of the Lease would pass, along with sovereignty over other British administered territory, to the appropriate successor Dominion which, by the terms of Partition, would of course mean Pakistan since the leased areas were certainly not at that moment contiguous with India and they clearly possessed a Muslim-majority population. There is, therefore, more than a hint here that Mountbatten hoped that the role of guardian of the Northern Frontier would be filled in the end by India rather than by Pakistan. This is a conclusion very strongly reinforced by the logic of the history examined here in some detail in Chapters 3 and 4. If, while he was contemplating the future of the Gilgit Lease, Mountbatten was not yet aware of M.A. Jinnah's interest in Kashmir he could have been left in no doubt on 17 May 1947 when M.A. Jinnah pointed out to him the significance of the name Pakistan. He explained the derivation of the word Pakistan - P for Pulljab; A for Afghan (i.e. Pathan or N.W.F.P.); K for Kashmir; I for nothing because that letter was not in the word in Urdu; S for Sind and TAN for the last syllable for Baluchistan. "' In June 1947, with the announcement of the 15 August 1947 deadline for the Transfer of Power, the problem of the future intentions of the two big States which had indicated an interest in an independent existence after Pal-tition. Hyder:lbad and Jamn~u and Kashmir, became much more urgent. Mountbatten made it abundantly clear that he was personally unhappy about the prospect of independence for either. On 9 June 1947 he announced that he was instructing the British Residents in both States to urge the Rulers to make no announcements on independence until he had had the opportunity to visit them and discuss the matter with them in person.' l Mountbatten, accompanied by Lady Mountbatten and by his Chief of Staff Lord Ismay, arrived in Srinagar on 17 June 1947 and was back in New Delhi six days later. Just before his departure, on 14 June 1947, Mountbatten received a private letter from Krishna Menon which, in a somewhat confused and emotional manner, warned him that there might be dire consequences for the future of Anglo-Indian relations if the State of Jammu and Kashmir were permitted to go to Pakistan. The gist of the argument seemed to be that it might be perceived that British policy, while accepting the abandonment of India, was to make Pakistan, strengthened by the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, into the eastern frontier of a British sphere of influence in the Middle East. Such a development would not be at all popular in the newly independent India; and it might put at risk the extensive British interests there. It was essential in Menon's view that State of Jammu and Kashmir be brought within the Indian fold.'2 As he was about to set out from New Delhi for Srinagar Mountbatten received a long Note on Kashmir, dated 17 June 1947, which he had earlier requested Jawaharlal Nehru to prepare for him. After pointing out that in the State of Jammu and Kashmir the Muslims made up 77% of the total population, Nehru argued that the people of the State would approve of its accession to India because of their devotion to Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference. The Muslim Conference, which had allied itself to M.A. Jinnah's Muslim League, "had little influence in the State". In 1946, at the time of the "Quit Kashmir" movement (when Nehru had suffered the humiliation of being refused admission to that region whence his family had sprung, as we have already seen in Chapter 5), the Prime Minister of Kashmir, Pandit Kak, had ruthlessly suppressed the National Conference, putting Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues in prison, and had punished its supporters by withholding supplies of fuel and food to the population of the Vale of ~ashmir during the winter, and by allowing the police and military to open fire on crowds, killing many people. Kak's regime was corrupt and dominated by a small clique; but it had both frightened and isolated the ~aharaja. Kak, Nehru continued, had told the Maharaja that ~ountbatten personally favoured the State joining Pakistan not only because of its geographical position but also because, if it joined India, the result would be "communal riots in the State and that possibly hostile people from the surrounding territory of Pakistan might enter Kashmir and give trouble". In that Mountbatten had never said anything of the sort to anybody, this piece of hearsay could only have served to irritate the Viceroy and increase his distrust of the current Prime Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.I3 From all this, and more, Jawaharlal Nehru drew the following conclusions. The State of Jammu and Kashmir should undergo major reform to become a democracy with the Maharaja as its consitutional head. In order to achieve this goal, Pandit Kak had to be removed as Prime Minister and Sheikh Abdullah and his associates released from prison. "What happens in Kashmir", Nehru went on, "is, of course, of the first importance to India as a whole not only because of the past year's occurrences there,14 which have drawn attention to it, but also because of the great strategic importance of that frontier state". Nehru concluded: if any attempt is made to push Kashmir into the Pakistan Constituent Assembly there is likely to be much trouble because the National Conference is not in favour of it and the Maharaja's position would also become very difficult. The normal and obvious course appears to be for Kashmir to join the Constituent Assembly of India. This will satisfy both the popular demand and the Maharaja's wishes. It is absurd to think that Pakistan would create trouble if this happens.I5 This fascinating document repays careful study. It cannot have failed to impress Mountbatten. While in Srinagar, Mountbatten was unable to persuade the Maharaja to discuss serious matters. Nor could he, as Jawaharlal Nehru had suggested he try, see Sheikh Abdullah in prison; and Lady Mountbatten found it impracticable to meet Begum Abdullah. Mountbatten made no attempt to visit another of the Maharaja's political prisoners, Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas, or to seek the views of Mirwaiz Mohammed Yusuf Shah (which might have been hard going because of the Mirwaiz's virtually complete lack of English). He did, however, communicate with the State Prime Minister, Pandit Kak. The record here is capable of being interpreted in more than one way. Mountbatten (in the form of reporting a discussion with the Maharaja which it would seem may never have taken place - the Maharaja went out of his way to avoid the slightest policy discussion with the Viceroy) advised Kak that the State of Jammu and Kashmir would have to accede to either India or Pakistan as it would have great difficulty protecting itself on its own. However, it was not for him . . . [Mountbatten] . . . to suggest \\.hich Constituent Assembly they should join, but clearly Kashmir should \vork this out for themselves on the basis of the best advantage to the ruler and his people, and in consideration of the factors of geograph! ;1nd the probiihle attitude of the Congress and of the Muslim League respecti\.el~ to  Kashmir. If Kashmir joined the Pakistan Constituent Assembly presumably Mr. Jinnah would protect them against pressure from the Congress. If they joined the Hindustan Assembly it would be inevitable that they would be treated with consideration by Hindustan.'" At first sight this is fairly evenhanded. But is it? There is, for example, the certainty of a Congress welcome contrasted with the probability of Mr. Jinnah's ability to "protect" against some danger unspecified. would not be too difficult to interpret these words as implying that the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir would be well advised to join India if he entertained any hope of retaining his own position in the State. The Congress would keep him on his throne: Mr. Jinnah and his Muslim League would make sure that his Muslim subjects brought about his overthrow." Almost immediately on his return to New Delhi from Srinagar, Mountbatten reported the results to Jawaharlal Nehru. He said that he had advised Pandit Kak that the decision to join either India or Pakistan could well be deferred for a while, until the situation was a bit clearer, but that in the meantime there should be no statement about independence. He had suggested that, pending a decision, the State of Jammu and Kashniir should enter into a "standstill" agreement with both India and Pakistan. In the end, before finally making up his mind, the Maharaja "should consult the will of the people and do what the majority thought best" for the State. If this consulting of "the will of the people" meant what was indicated in Nehru's Note of 17 June, then Mountbatten may well have believed that the outcome, under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah, would have been accession to India. Jawaharlal Nehru was disappointed that Mountbatten had been "unable to solve the problem of Kashmir, for", he declared, "the problem would not be solved until Sheikh Abdullah was released from prison and the rights of the people restored". He seemed determined to go up to Srinagar himself to see what he could achieve. It was with great difficulty that Mountbatten was able to dissuade him on the grounds that Nehru "really must look to his duty to the Indian people as a whole. There were four hundred millions in India and only four millions in Kashmir". It was rather irresponsible of the future Prime Minister of India, Mountbatten observed, to spend SO much time on what was but one of the many grave ~roblems confronting him. It was agreed eventually that Mahatma Gandhi *hould go to Kashmir in Nehru's place to take up the "question of Sheikh Abdullah"; and Mounthatten wrote to the Maharaja to pave the \vay.IH CVhen the Maharaja tried to put Gandhi off, Nehrrl revived hi* own plan to yo: Mountbatten found it far from easy to ~ersuade him to *tick to the original arrangement.'"he Gandhi visit in due